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Introduction
Matthew Charles and Howard Eiland
Who can still speak of youth today?
--Franz Kafka, “Investigations of a Dog”
It is well known that Walter Benjamin played a leading role in the antebellum German 
Youth Movement, publishing articles on school reform and youth culture, attending and 
organizing lectures and conferences on these two closely related issues, and serving as president 
of the radical Berlin chapter of the Independent Students Association under the aegis of his 
mentor, the educational theorist Gustav Wyneken. It is not often asked, however, whether this 
intensive involvement with the youth movement had any bearing on Benjamin’s subsequent 
philosophical and literary activity. What happened to his idea of education and of youth after he 
turned away from student activism with the onset of war and pursued what he considered a more 
invisible radicalism? Was his educational ideal effectively aborted? Or was it absorbed in his 
later historical-materialist concerns, and, if so, in what form? And what, in particular, became of 
the vision of a community of learning after his much-prolonged student days were over and he 
had failed—rather spectacularly—to gain a teaching position in the German academy?
As early as July 1914, a month before the declaration of war and the double suicide of his 
comrades Fritz Heinle and Rika Seligson in a meeting room of the Wynekenians, Benjamin had 
2written to a close friend that “the university is simply not the place to study,” and in October of 
that year, having given up the presidency of the Berlin independent students to which he had 
been reelected in July, he referred to the contemporary academy as a “swamp,” adding that “no 
one is equal to this situation.” He would, in fact, continue his formal academic studies until the 
withdrawal of his habilitation thesis on the German Trauerspiel in the summer of 1925 at 
Frankfurt; but, in a 1917 essay on Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, he adverts to “the failure of the youth 
movement” (whose life—youth’s, the movement’s—nonetheless remains “immortal”), and by 
1922, in a prospectus for an ultimately unrealized journal project, he could write that this journal, 
to have been named Angelus Novus after the Klee aquarelle, should “proclaim through the 
mutual alienness [wechselseitige Fremdheit] of [its authors’] contributions how impossible it is 
in our day to give voice to any communality [wie unaussprechlich in diesen Tagen jede 
Gemeinsamkeit…bleibt].” Thus with the fading of faith in the mission of youth, as well as in the 
prospect of a “new university” and the viability of any expression of authentic community save 
that of mutual otherness, the specific contents of a radical commitment to reform seemingly lose 
themselves (as Benjamin puts it in the Dostoevsky essay) in their own light. The space would 
have thereby been cleared for what he calls, soon after the war, a politics of “pure means,” 
involving an educative power operating beyond the paradigm of obedience to an external law.
This special issue of boundary 2 proposes to investigate the significance of both 
Benjamin’s engagement with educational reform in his early writings and the afterlife of that 
engagement in his later work, where the university as platform for cultural renewal has given 
way to various new possibilities of dissemination, including radio and the stage of the Brechtian 
epic theater and of the proletarian children’s theater, and where the theme of youth has in general 
3been transposed to that of childhood and the theme of pedagogy to that of study and studious 
play.
Already in the culminating statement of his school-reform writings, “The Life of 
Students” of 1914-1915 (an essay discussed in more detail by several of the contributors to this 
special issue), Benjamin decries the “perversion of the creative spirit into the vocational spirit,” a 
development that over time has taken possession of the universities and consolidated that 
“hostile and uncomprehending estrangement of the academy from the life that art requires.” He 
calls on students to become aware of the crisis of metaphysical and moral uncertainty underlying 
modern society, to get over their fear of solitude and fear of surrender in preparation for the 
struggle against conformism and dogmatism, and to work toward a form of life (Lebensform) 
that, while making the highest demands on the individual person and maintaining concern for 
humanity as a whole, would put into practice that “expansive friendship of the creative which is 
oriented toward infinity.” Such a practice is at the basis of “philosophical community.” The 
latter, understood not as a circle of shared assumptions but as a confrontation and colloquy of 
free individual consciences—that is, as a peculiar kind of unity in dispersion—would by its very 
existence militate against the massification and rigidification of study. The educational 
community is philosophical, in the young Benjamin’s view, not only by virtue of its reading—
from grammar school onward—philosophical texts of all kinds (preeminently in works of art), 
but just as importantly through its embrace of “the peril of spiritual life” and its fostering of 
“permanent spiritual revolution”in the form of new expansive ways of questioning.
In other words, a notion of play (one indebted to the classical tradition of thought on the 
subject from Plato through Schiller to Nietzsche) is decisively at work in Benjamin’s educational 
theory from the beginning. The child retains not what is learned by rote but only what is learned 
4in a spirit of play or adventure.  At issue, once again, is not an accumulation and application of 
knowledge as an end in itself, let alone as a means of power over others, but an awakening of 
spirit at once intellectual and political: a transformation and revolution (Plato’s periagōgē) of 
personal and collective experience by means of the rigorous interrogation of received opinion. 
Such education in the root sense of a drawing-out and critical turnaround of each individual 
self—“Each person will discover his or her own imperatives”—would open up a true culture of 
conversation throughout the social arena, thereby infusing everyday modernity with 
metaphysical seriousness—this was the hope of the new worldly religiosity of the movement—
and making it possible, through the expansive concentration of historical remembrance, to 
“liberate the future from its deformation in the present.”
It follows from this fundamental critique and reconception of student experience—and 
one can glimpse here a cornerstone of Benjamin’s whole multifaceted lifework—that genuinely 
productive, emancipatory learning necessitates before all else a meticulous and continually 
renewed excavation of that precipitous ground of “the present,” conditioned and encompassed as 
it always is by processes of language and history. Revolution begins in the situation of the self.
***
Four of the ten papers collected in this special issue of boundary 2—those by Antonia 
Birnbaum, Matthew Charles, Elise Derroitte and Howard Eiland—were given as talks for a 
conference on “Walter Benjamin, Pedagogy and the Politics of Youth,” co-hosted by the Institute 
for Modern and Contemporary Culture (University of Westminster, London) and the Centre for 
Research in Modern European Philosophy (Kinston University, London) in May 31-June 1, 
52013. The conference was organized in response to a conjunction of two moments considered 
significant for the contemporary reception of Benjamin’s thought.
First, the publication in 2011 of Benjamin’s Early Writings on educational reform. 
(Although the first volume of the Selected Writings, published in 1996, included a number of 
Benjamin’s early essays on youth, only two—“‘Experience’” and “The Metaphysics of 
Youth”—date from the period prior to his disillusionment with Wyneken). The conference 
sought to anticipate the different ways in which these early articles and addresses on school 
reform might provoke a renewed interest in Benjamin’s philosophy of education and its 
significance for the more familiar political writings contained in his later work. The subsequent 
availability in English of his surviving radio scripts (Radio Benjamin) from the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, some of which were written for children, should only intensify this interest in the 
pedagogical underpinnings of Benjamin’s practices.
Second, the translations–a century later–of these writings from the youth movement 
happened to coincide with a wave of student protests and occupations against education cuts, 
tuition fee increases, and what is typically described as the neoliberal transformation of formal 
systems of education that was erupting across the Americas and Europe between 2009 and 2013, 
phenomena including–but not limited to–Vienna’s Academy of Refusal in 2009, Occupy 
California in 2009-2010, the Puerto Rico strikes of 2010-2011, the UK demonstrations of 2010-
2012, the Chilean Winter of 2011-2013, and the Quebec protests of 2012. Indeed, a number of 
the articles contained in this collection arose from versions of talks given to students in occupied 
universities during this period. Without wishing to suggest any simplistic identity between the 
educational reform movements of the 1910s and the educational resistance movements of the 
2010s, the conference nonetheless sought to ask whether or not this contemporary context might 
6open up a moment of retrospective illumination–a “now of recognizability”–in which a 
fundamental pedagogical dimension of Benjamin’s work might be simultaneously revealed and 
rethought. 
The articles in this special issue are therefore meant to construct something of the 
prehistory and afterlife of Benjamin’s early writings. As Élise Derriotte demonstrates in 
“Brushing Education Against the Grain,” these writings are to be situated within a tradition of 
late-nineteenth-century Reformpädogogie that, influenced by Dilthey and Nietzsche, had come to 
dominate debates on educational reform in the early twentieth century. Opposing the moribund 
intellectualism of the German educational system with the lived experience of learning, 
Benjamin’s early concept of education promotes a will to learn intimately connected to a mission 
of broader cultural transformation. Accordingly, the early writings “offer no manual for 
teachers,” Derroitte writes, but rather provoke crucial questions about the purpose of education, 
questions that resist tendencies both to instrumentalized vocationalism and to a narrow 
academicism disconnected from the future lives of its students.
Derroitte suggests that “Benjamin’s early pedagogical writings …contain in nuce 
practically all the elements of Benjamin’s later critical method,” and she sees these as clustered 
around four central themes–tradition, history, experience and freedom–which are explored 
further in the other contributions to this issue. In “Pedagogy as ‘Cryptic Politics’,” Matthew 
Charles takes up the theme of tradition in terms of Benjamin’s critique of a moral education 
understood as teaching by example and his alternative conception of transmissibility. This 
involves not the reproduction of teachings but, for each generation, their preparation into a form 
capable of being received by individual learners. The significance attached to instruction here 
already represents, Charles argues, a break from the solitude of learning in Benjamin’s earlier 
7writings, one that bears the traces of his turn away from the tragic nihilism of his early 
Nietzscheanism and provides the pedagogical foundations for the “cryptic politics” of his later 
anti-Nietzscheanism.
Howard Eiland’s “Education as Awakening” invokes the challenging complementarity of 
the legacies of Nietzsche and Marx, as constituting a fundamental tension within Benjamin’s 
work as a whole, before going on to explicate in a series of his early texts an historicized 
(Marxian and Nietzschean) version of the old messianic motif of awakening in its interplay with 
the motifs of experience and learning. Benjamin’s participation in the youth movement is seen to 
center on educational reform as the catalyst of a more general reform of consciousness: the 
“protest against school and family” is a protest against the instrumentalization of thought and 
language. Eiland shows how the idea of an awakening youth (in young people and in people 
generally), an awakening predicated on a certain historical dialectic, is for Benjamin instantiated 
in the productivity of students andto a thematic complex of Nietzsche and Marx, suggesting that 
the philosophy of history that emerges out of the tension between these thinkers is constructed 
from a concept of experience that, in his early thought, concurrently gives rise to a theory of 
education. The historical dialectic given expression, a decade before the Arcade Project’s 
intertwining of dream and awakening, in Benjamin’s 1917 poem “On Seeing the Morning 
Light,” therefore answers the question of how awakening “could …take its own measure” 
through the elaboration of a dialectical understanding of learning: “the varied ramification of his 
idea of the individuated collectivity of study. 
Eli Friedlander, in “Learning from the Colors of Fantasy,” asks whether it would be 
possible to learn in a world in which (positively) there are no obstacles to our endeavors or 
alternatively (negatively) no possible consistency to our successes, and consequently no 
8experience to learn from. Under such conditions, he suggests, it would first be necessary to learn 
what fear or pain are. Previously, tradition and imagination could serve as the conduits by which 
a lifetime of experiences might be passed on to future generations, but the “sickness of tradition” 
manifested under capitalist modernity now demands not the creative capacity of the imagination 
but the deformative power of Phantasie. This is prominently exemplified, for Benjamin, in the 
childhood experience of colors, which are formless, ephemeral and inimitable. Phantasie turns 
spatiotemporal phenomena inside out and so, Friedlander concludes, recovers one possible way 
of learning from modern experience.
Two articles, by Sami R. Khatib and Antonia Birnbaum, take up the relationship between 
education and freedom in Benjamin’s thought. Khatib’s “Practice Makes Perfect” investigates 
Benjamin’s “enduring intellectual interest in pedagogy” from the perspective of a “proto-
deconstructive” project for undoing bourgeois education, the latter exemplified in the Kantian 
distinction between physical and practical pedagogy. Kant’s physical pedagogy entails a 
conservative disciplining of our childish or animal instincts; practical pedagogy, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the liberal cultivation of human freedom. While Benjamin’s early 
philosophy radicalizes the former (no longer a freedom in accordance with duty but a permanent 
revolutionizing of values), his later–more Marxist–response to Kantian pedagogy suspends the 
very difference between the two, Khatib argues, by appealing to an understanding of “freedom 
with.” The latter is manifest in a different kind of bodily will and learning through practice—
Benjamin adduces proletarian children’s theater as a model—and in an encounter with the 
savagery of the childlike or creaturely, which is no longer to be overcome but rather dialectically 
worked through in relation to a more integral practice. 
9Antonia Birnbaum’s “Beyond Autonomy” similarly addresses and reworks Kant’s 
fundamental question of freedom: “what must I do?” Using Benjamin’s essay “The Life of 
Students” reflect on a series of provocations about the life of creative thought within and without 
the academy, Birnbaum answers these questions by reconceiving the practice of studying so as 
“to stop putting off learning.” Benjamin’s “will to study” suggests a freedom that “rips life out of 
being ‘only life,’” she suggests, and in doing so fundamentally interrupts the continual 
postponement of thinking within the rhythms of everyday life. This kind of study is not “a reality 
apart” from the world, but a part of the world inquired into. To continue the life of thinking 
today, Birnbaum concludes, it may be better to cling to the variable practice of study itself than 
to the autonomy of institutions within which it has traditionally been sheltered, but which, as we 
know, provided no shelter for Walter Benjamin. 
Investigations of Benjamin’s political thought quite rightly tend to concentrate on the 
period at the beginning of the 1920s when he undertook what he envisioned would be a large-
scale study in politics, but of which only the essay “The Critique of Violence” survives intact. If 
one of the intentions of this special issue is to frame this political project of the early 1920s in 
relation to what Irving Wohlfarth has called the “politics of Youth” that preceded it, and in 
relation to the more or less explicit resurfacing of these educational interests in the later writings 
on “communist pedagogy” and the “crisis of transmissibility,” James Martel’s article draws 
attention to one strand of this broader frame running through the difficult argument of the “The 
Critique of Violence.” 
Martel’s “A Divine Pedagogy?” rehearses the essay’s more familiar distinction between 
the mythic violence of the law and a “divine violence” that counteracts this, before  proceeding 
to foreground Benjamin’s less well known identification of such divine violence with a form of 
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education. Martel argues that this invocation of an “educative power, which in its perfected form 
stands outside the law,” is problematic in ascribing a divine force to human action, and thus 
apparently going against much of what Benjamin argues in the rest of the essay. Drawing on 
Benjamin’s “The Life of Students” to resist this identification of human and divine, Martel offers 
an original interpretation of the concept of educative power as an in-between force, neither fully 
mythic nor fully divine, through which it becomes possible “to rethink ourselves and our place in 
the world.” Utilizing Benjamin’s playful “Teaching Aid” in One-Way Street, Martel expounds 
the theme of education as a “pure means” in which the teacher effectively disappears as a central 
node of authority.
 With reference to Benjamin’s scattered writings on Kafka, and to Kafka’s various and 
persistent depictions of studiers, Brendan Moran’s “Kafkan Study” explores a comparable idea 
in developing the thesis that study is obliged to nothing, which is to say, constrained by nothing 
and beholden to nothing except the obligation to remain thoughtfully open, to maintain a 
continually renewed resistance to the the various forms of mythically driven closure in human 
affairs. For these reified forms disregard the nothing that everywhere calls for study. The “study-
act,” argues Moran, is not any sort of job; in its brooding happy asceticism, it is indifferent to 
worldly measures of success and failure. If it is essentially released from the parameters of 
possession and everything proprietary and conclusive, it is nevertheless oriented by a sense of 
justice in all it does. Kafkan study involves attentiveness to the wreckage of human progress and 
to the untoward redemptive possibilities embedded within the exceptional and the extreme. 
Finally, Esther Leslie’s “Playspaces of Anthropological Materialist Pedagogy” and Brian 
Elliott’s “Beyond Critique” both reflect on a central concern of Benjamin’s later pedagogical-
cultural thinking, one not yet crystallized in the earlier writings: technology. As Leslie points 
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out, Benjamin’s expanded sense of the pedagogical comes to include all things which provide an 
occasion for learning; such things are addressed in terms of “how they might enable the 
development of new habits or the shattering of old ones.” This program of rigorous 
improvisation is of special relevance for the training of the new collective bodily nature of 
humanity, something nascent in the epoch of industrial capitalism. Leslie explores the 
technological possibilities that Benjamin saw opened up by film, radio and toys as playspaces for 
the liberation of the human eye, ear and hand—spaces in which habit itself is put on display and 
made conscious, so as to be played with constructively.
Elliott, in “Beyond Critique,” claims that the novelty of Benjamin’s pedagogical 
methodology in One-Way Street has been largely underestimated and that its development of 
new practices of socially engaged and politically charged communication should be recognized 
as involving a rejection of the usual scholarly standpoint of academic critique. Modelled on the 
lessons of avant-garde art practices and the aesthetics of commodity advertising, this new set of 
practices, Elliott argues, is primarily concerned with the somatic transformation of humanity 
through technology. The pedagogic basis of this transhumanism, however, is rooted not in 
“futuristic technical applications” but in “the future which we, the present generation, already 
are, thanks to our ‘arrangement’ with the previous generation.” Elliott concludes that the 
historical task our generation must respond to is not “the invasion of aesthetic space by the 
everyday environment” but a comparable technological invasion of pedagogic space, and that 
Benjamin’s thought contains salutary lessons for our response. 
The historical and institutional context of Benjamin’s early writings is, of course, very 
different from ours. What does come to light from a reconsideration of these writings is the 
continuing relevance of a set of radical pedagogical concerns for contemporary critical theories 
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of education. We say this not because Benjamin’s work contains any straightforward solution to 
our present educational dilemmas, but precisely because his constantly evolving and shifting 
mode of philosophizing  challenges many of our own habits of teaching practice. These involve 
the theoretical limitations of, for example, the liberal humanist tradition, the dogmatic elements 
of the Marxist tradition, and the nascent Nietzschean undercurrents of later post-structualism and 
post-humanism. If the Benjaminian idea of education is finally not a means to some further end 
(be it social justice or the conservation of existing order) but the spatiotemporal interruption of 
all such ends, one that blurs the distinction between the inside and outside of educational spaces, 
then this idea of learning in itself points to that secret intergenerational agreement that Benjamin 
elsewhere describes in terms of a “weak messianic power.” At issue in the present case is the 
formidable task of clearing the space for a studious and playful reception of what has been lost 
and of what has not yet arrived.
